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JUSTICE KENNEDY AND  
THE DOMAINS OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
Heather K. Gerken∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Many have noticed that Justice Kennedy softened his stance on 
race in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1.1  To be sure, he has always been one of the more moderate 
members of the colorblindness camp, defecting on occasion.  But he 
has nonetheless taken a hard line in cases like Metro Broadcasting2 
and Croson.3  Both the substance and the rhetoric of his concurrence 
in Parents Involved were importantly different. 
The quickly emerging consensus is that Justice Kennedy’s new po-
sition on race stems from his new position on the Court.4  Like his 
swing-vote predecessors Justices Powell and O’Connor, Kennedy is 
feeling the pressure associated with being the middle Justice on a di-
vided Court.  The deep logic of this middle kingdom, so the story goes, 
pushes for the kind of compromise that each of these Justices has en-
dorsed.  It is something akin to a “don’t ask, don’t tell”5 approach to 
race-conscious decisionmaking: use race, but don’t be obvious about it.  
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s settlement on race closely resembles Pow-
ell’s and O’Connor’s.  He deemed obvious and straightforward uses of 
race illegitimate but left room for schools to pursue their objectives 
through indirect and general means.  He shunned labels and “racial 
balancing” while lauding the idea that race contributes to diversity.  At 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  Given the time constraints involved in writing this 
Comment, I have plagued a number of colleagues by sending them hastily dashed-off drafts, half-
formed ideas, and inchoate arguments, and they have responded with patience, good humor, and 
intelligence.  My heartiest thanks are therefore owed to Bruce Ackerman, Will Baude, Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Guy Charles, Lani Guinier, Michael Kang, Daryl Levinson, Greg Magarian, Mar-
tha Minow, Robert Post, Ben Sachs, Reva Siegel, and Damian Williams.  Excellent research assis-
tance was provided on short notice by students with full-time summer jobs, including Scott Grin-
sell, Jill Habig, Marin Levy, Matt McKenzie, Bharat Ramamurti, and Shayna Strom. 
 1 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the  
judgment). 
 2 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 3 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 4 See, e.g., Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
movabletype/archives/2007/06/commentary_the_5.html (June 28, 2007, 2:27 PM).  
 5 For a different twist on this phrase, see Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: 
Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007). 
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first glance, it all seems conventional and pat.  The conventional view, 
in short, is that the story of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence begins with 
Bakke6 and Grutter.7 
I disagree.  While Justice Kennedy’s new role as a swing vote 
surely helps explain his opinion in Parents Involved, his “settlement” 
on race is recognizably different from the terrain once occupied by Jus-
tices Powell and O’Connor.  The “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to 
race is the compromise of a pragmatist.  But Justice Kennedy has al-
ways been an idealist, and his concurrence in Parents Involved is an 
idealistic opinion.  He speaks in the cadence of a constitutional roman-
tic, not a fact-driven realist.  Further, Kennedy relies on indirect and 
general race-conscious strategies for different reasons than Powell and 
O’Connor do.  And while he seems more open to embracing a positive 
vision of race and thinking about the state’s inevitable role in con-
structing identity, his vision may also be more tied to context and less 
generalizable across cases. 
To identify the precise contours of Kennedy’s settlement on race, 
we should begin not with Bakke or Grutter, but with League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry,8 a voting-rights decision 
issued last year.  There Justice Kennedy, long hostile to the use of race 
in redistricting, objected to the dismantling of a majority-minority dis-
trict on the rather remarkable ground that the Latinos mobilizing there 
“had found an efficacious political identity.”9  Following on LULAC’s 
heels was Parents Involved, where Justice Kennedy suggested that ra-
cially drawn attendance zones and race-conscious school siting deci-
sions — both variants of race-conscious districting — represent appro-
priate means for local schools to deal with the problem of racial 
segregation.10  Both of these positions run directly contrary to Justice 
Kennedy’s prior equal protection jurisprudence.11 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 7 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  For comparisons between Kennedy’s opinion and 
Bakke/Grutter, see, for example, Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin. 
blogspot.com/2007/06/parents-involved-swan-song-or-bakke-for.html (June 28, 2007, 1:58 PM); 
and Posting of Pamela S. Karlan to Supreme Court — School Integration, http://scintegration. 
blogspot.com/2007/07/guest-blogger-new-four-horsemen.html (July 2, 2007, 12:00 PM). 
 8 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
 9 Id. at 2619. 
 10 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 11 Justice Kennedy has resoundingly rejected race-conscious districting in every voting-rights 
decision to come before him.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–14 (1995).  And he 
has been quite clear on the analytic point — it is the decision to use race, not the obviousness of 
its use, that is the source of the constitutional harm.  See id.; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a law school cannot evade strict scrutiny by using “the con-
cept of critical mass . . . to mask” its effort to achieve “racial balance”). 
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These concrete doctrinal reversals were paired with noticeable 
shifts in Justice Kennedy’s views on race.  In the electoral context, Jus-
tice Kennedy has gone from believing that race is an artificial identity 
imposed by the state — and a destructive one at that — to insisting 
that the state must maintain certain racially organized political com-
munities.  In the schools context, Justice Kennedy has moved from 
lauding a colorblind approach to brainstorming about the most useful 
race-conscious strategies the state can use to construct the educational 
space in which students learn about race. 
The link between these cases is not merely the fact that Justice 
Kennedy has something new to say about race, but the reason that he 
does.  In both cases, it is when Justice Kennedy stops talking directly 
about race that he says something new about it.  The novel elements of 
Kennedy’s equal protection jurisprudence — the bits and pieces that 
do not follow easily from his prior opinions — have less to do with 
race than the constitutional domain12 in which each case arose.  In de-
scribing the voting-rights claim of Latinos in LULAC, Justice Kennedy 
tells the story he has long associated with the electoral domain, one 
having to do with political agency and expression rather than equality.  
He speaks in the cadence of the First Amendment, not the Four-
teenth.13  Similarly, in evaluating the equal protection claims raised in 
Parents Involved, the novel portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinion fo-
cus not on race, but on a story Kennedy has long associated with the 
educational domain — the exceptional role that public schools play in 
inculcating civic morality.  It is a story about what students learn in 
school, not whether they have an equal opportunity to do so.  One 
could eliminate all references to race in the two opinions and the un-
derlying stories would still make sense. 
How is it that not talking directly about race has helped Justice 
Kennedy say something new about it?  I believe it has to do with the 
idea of displacement as a source of power, a phrase Shakespeare 
scholar Stephen Greenblatt once used to explain why writing about 
Macbeth helped him think more clearly about Iraq.14  It is an idea 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 The term, of course, comes from ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995).  
To be sure, the domains I identify are different from Post’s.  See id. at 1–2 (describing three do-
mains: “community, management, and democracy”).  Indeed, in some respects the two “domains” I 
describe here more closely resemble what Michael Walzer would term “spheres,” see MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983), as they are tied to a sense of place as well as a particular 
form of social ordering.  See Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1422, 
1425 (1996) (offering a lucid analysis of the two books and suggesting the notion of “place” as one 
means of differentiating between them).      
 13 It is at least not in the cadence of Justice Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment.  One could 
easily imagine a vision of equal protection that fits the story Justice Kennedy tells. 
 14 Stephen Greenblatt, Comments at the Yale Law School Legal Theory Workshop (Feb. 15, 
2006). 
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with ramifications not only for understanding Kennedy’s concurrence, 
but for thinking about race more generally. 
Perhaps we should not be surprised that displacement has served a 
useful function for Justice Kennedy in the context of race.  Lani 
Guinier has written that race is a “neon light” that can attract our at-
tention away from the real source of a problem.15  By averting his eyes 
from the neon light, Justice Kennedy sees something different from the 
story he has always told about racial essentialism. 
In both cases, the story Justice Kennedy associates with the rele-
vant domain — the First Amendment in the electoral context, impart-
ing civic morality in the educational context — serves as a lens.  It di-
rects his attention away from his usual narrative about race toward 
the values he otherwise associates with each domain.  Kennedy has 
long recognized that the political sphere involves robust associational 
and expressive dimensions, but now he sees how those values connect 
to racial politics.  Kennedy has long thought of schools as institutions 
for teaching students to be citizens, but now he sees that those lessons 
extend to interracial relations. 
Viewing Kennedy’s opinions as domain-centered narratives also 
exposes an evocative but underdeveloped set of ideas in LULAC and 
Parents Involved.  Both opinions acknowledge the associational and 
expressive dimensions of racial identity.  Indeed, we see in Kennedy a 
dawning awareness of the relationship between them — that the 
choices a state makes in grouping individuals affects the choices indi-
viduals make in expressing their identity.  A domain-centered narra-
tive, in other words, has brought Kennedy’s account of racial identity 
much closer to the account offered by many scholars. 
This Comment will examine this admittedly inchoate but nonethe-
less intriguing turn Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence has taken.  There 
are dangers, of course, in focusing so heavily on Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence.  Swing Justices tend to spawn a cottage industry purport-
ing to interpret swing opinions but amounting to little more than pae-
ans to the powerful.  That is not my intention.  I focus on Justice Ken-
nedy simply because, given the state of our judiciary, any new story 
about race will have to appeal to intellectually open mainstream con-
servatives.  It is thus useful to figure out what has caused Justice Ken-
nedy’s thinking to evolve. 
It would be foolhardy, however, to suggest that what follows is the 
only way to read LULAC and Parents Involved or to wager that these 
two decisions signal a permanent shift in Justice Kennedy’s views.  
The gloss I offer here is decidedly mine, not Justice Kennedy’s; this is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Comment: Admissions Rituals as Politi-
cal Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 189–90 (2003). 
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an interpretive argument, not a psychoanalytic account.  My goal is to 
identify the new developments in Justice Kennedy’s race jurisprudence 
and try to offer the best account of how they fit together.  There is a 
significant risk that by largely ignoring the anti-essentialist boilerplate 
in both opinions, I underplay the continuity between these and Justice 
Kennedy’s prior opinions.  The parts of his opinion I spin out here 
represent tentative gestures and initial instincts.  Whether the Justice 
ever pursues them remains to be seen. 
Part I describes the new stance Justice Kennedy has adopted in his 
two most recent race decisions.  It argues that the easiest constitutional 
stories for Justice Kennedy to tell in these cases were not stories about 
race, but narratives he otherwise associates with each domain.  Those 
stories, in turn, nudge Kennedy in interesting new directions, softening 
his views on race and race neutrality. 
Part II reflects on why Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence has taken 
this new turn and where we should go from here.  Specifically, it asks 
whether the power associated with displacement extends beyond what 
I view as a welcome shift in Justice Kennedy’s views.  Most of us 
think we already know the story of race.  We tell the same story no 
matter what the domain.  But every domain — schools, the market-
place, democracy — has an overarching narrative.  What if we tried to 
fit race within that narrative rather than vice versa?  The point here is 
not that we should stop talking about race, but that by dipping into 
the vocabularies of different constitutional domains, we might find 
something new to say, just as Justice Kennedy has.  This Comment 
concludes by offering some brief thoughts on the ways in which a do-
main-centered approach to equal protection might help us both see 
nuances in the stories we tell about race and identify the overarching 
themes that connect them. 
I.  OF ELECTIONS AND EDUCATION 
This Part analyzes the new developments in Justice Kennedy’s 
story about race and provides an account that makes sense of them.  
Because I believe that the story of Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents 
Involved begins with LULAC, not Bakke or Grutter, I will start there. 
A.  LULAC 
LULAC, which involved various challenges to Tom DeLay’s mid-
decade redistricting in Texas, was widely expected to be a case about 
partisan gerrymandering.  Instead, the decision turned on section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act.16  The Republicans had dismantled a congres-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
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sional district, District 23, that had just attained a Latino majority and 
created a new Latino-majority district elsewhere in the state by way of 
an offset.17  Their reasons for doing so were straightforward.  Latinos 
in District 23 did not support the Republican incumbent, Congressman 
Henry Bonilla.  In the prior election, he had captured just eight per-
cent of the Latino vote,18 and Republicans were worried that “Latinos 
would vote Bonilla out of office” if the district were not changed sub-
stantially.19  The Court, per Justice Kennedy, held that the decision to 
dismantle the district violated the Act.  It further held that this viola-
tion was not remedied by the creation of the offset district.20 
LULAC is arguably a greater departure from Justice Kennedy’s 
prior jurisprudence than is his concurrence in Parents Involved.  Until 
LULAC, Justice Kennedy had never voted to find a violation of the 
Voting Rights Act and had repeatedly expressed reservations about the 
Act’s constitutionality because it required the state to engage in race-
conscious districting.21  Justice Kennedy had also consistently signed 
on to the Court’s Shaw v. Reno22 decisions, which struck down many 
majority-minority districts prior to LULAC and whose anti-essentialist 
underpinnings were in considerable tension with the Act’s race-
conscious mandates.  To be sure, in LULAC Justice Kennedy com-
plained vehemently about the offset district in language quite similar 
to that used to condemn many a majority-minority district under 
Shaw.23  But something about the story of District 23 moved him. 
Consider Justice Kennedy’s striking explanation for finding that 
Texas had violated the Voting Rights Act: “The Latinos in District 23 
had found an efficacious political identity . . . .”24  It is a remarkable 
phrase coming from a Justice who once compared the majority opinion 
in Metro Broadcasting to Plessy v. Ferguson on the ground that it en-
dorsed “the demeaning notion that [racial minorities] ascribe to certain 
‘minority views’ that must be different from those of other citizens.”25  
Even in redistricting cases, when confronted with evidence that whites 
and racial minorities in fact prefer different candidates at the polls, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2006). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 2615. 
 20 Id. at 2623. 
 21 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491–92 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Miller 
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926–27 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1028–29 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 22 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 23 Justice Kennedy all but lifted passages of his opinion in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, to 
describe the LULAC offset district.  See Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 14, on file with the Harvard Law School  
Library). 
 24 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619. 
 25 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Kennedy had always emphasized that “[w]hen the State assigns voters 
on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning as-
sumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same can-
didates at the polls.’”26 
Yet in LULAC Justice Kennedy lauded the efforts of Latinos orga-
nizing along racial lines and insisted the state could not thwart those 
efforts.  His prior jurisprudence seemed premised on the notion that 
racial identity is, at best, an artificial construct imposed by the state 
(and at worst a divisive, destabilizing force).  How could a Justice who 
once doubted whether an authentic racial identity even exists come to 
the view, let alone celebrate the fact, that the “Latinos in District 23 
had found an efficacious political identity”?27 
Though one should never parse judicial opinions as if they were 
statutes, I want to dwell a bit on that phrase because I think it offers a 
clue about the story Justice Kennedy was telling in LULAC.  If one 
shears away the sentence’s racial subject, what immediately springs to 
mind is the First Amendment, which is the dominant story of the elec-
toral domain in Kennedy’s eyes.  Justice Kennedy, of course, has long 
prided himself on his First Amendment commitments, and, rightly or 
wrongly, the First Amendment pops up repeatedly when Justice Ken-
nedy writes about election law.28 
If we recast Justice Kennedy’s story about racial politics in Texas 
as a First Amendment story, the narrative line becomes clear.  The La-
tinos in District 23 had built a political coalition over several years and 
were just about to reap its fruits, only to find their efforts thwarted by 
the partisan machinations of Tom DeLay and the Texas Republicans.  
As Kennedy wrote, “District 23’s Latino voters were poised to elect 
their candidate of choice.  They were becoming more politically active, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647). 
 27 Election law scholars are divided as to whether Justice Kennedy’s ruling in LULAC repre-
sents a departure from his equal protection jurisprudence. Compare Richard H. Pildes, The De-
cline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manu-
script at 6, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (LULAC was merely another chapter in 
the Court’s anti-essentialist jurisprudence), with Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and 
Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 9, on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library) (LULAC represents a departure from the Court’s anti-essentialist position), 
Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
743, 761 (2007) (Justice Kennedy’s interest in protecting Latinos was genuine), and Ellen D. Katz, 
Reviving the Right To Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library) (LULAC “necessarily acknowledged that race need not be a prob-
lem to overcome but can be a trait that unites people in positive ways and gives rise to communi-
ties of value”).  
 28 At least since Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 443 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), Justice 
Kennedy has had a soft spot for voting claims with expressive dimensions.  And he has recently 
insisted that partisan gerrymandering claims should be framed in First Amendment terms.  See 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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with a marked and continuous rise in Spanish-surnamed voter regis-
tration.  In successive elections Latinos were voting against Bonilla in 
greater numbers, and in 2002 they almost ousted him.”29  Justice Ken-
nedy was so angered by the state’s decision to “ma[k]e fruitless the La-
tinos’ mobilization efforts,” particularly the cynical targeting of “those 
Latinos who were becoming most politically active,” that he hinted 
darkly that the state may have engaged in intentional discrimination.30  
“In essence,” Kennedy wrote, “the State took away the Latinos’ oppor-
tunity because [they] were about to exercise it.”31 
Race, to be sure, was the organizing principle for political mobiliza-
tion in District 23.  With or without the overlay of race, however, these 
mobilization efforts were easily recognizable as cherished First 
Amendment activities.  Latinos in District 23 were united not just by 
race, but by a vibrant political association. 
For a First Amendment romantic like Justice Kennedy, the expres-
sive dimensions of the District 23 story must have been as compelling 
as its associational elements.  As Kennedy himself noted, “a racial 
group that has been subject to significant voting-related discrimina-
tion . . . was becoming increasingly politically active and cohesive.”32  
Further, by trying to vote out a Latino incumbent (albeit one who had 
voted to build a 700-mile fence on the Mexican border33), District 23’s 
Latinos were rejecting a cynical view of racial alignment.  They were 
not just voting out a Latino incumbent, but were coalescing against 
that candidate based on his substantive positions.34  Immigration pol-
icy, of course, is tied to identity, but it also implicates more mundane 
sources of political alliances: money, jobs.  Put differently, Latinos in 
District 23, at least in Kennedy’s eyes, had found an “efficacious po-
litical identity,” not a purely racial one. 
A domain-centered First Amendment story might even explain the 
central puzzle in LULAC.  Half of Kennedy’s voting-rights discussion 
censured the state for thwarting the mobilization efforts of Latinos in 
District 23.  The other half condemned the offset district using lan-
guage that could have been lifted directly from one of Kennedy’s own 
Shaw opinions — a line of cases decidedly hostile toward race-
conscious districting and racial politics generally — on the ground that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2621 (citation omitted). 
 30 See id. at 2622–23. 
 31 Id. at 2622. 
 32 Id. at 2621. 
 33 Lianne Hart, Runoff in Redrawn Texas District Could Be a Tight Race, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2006, at A16. 
 34 See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622 (“Latinos’ diminishing electoral support for Bonilla indicates 
their belief he was ‘unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group.’” (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986))). 
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it was not what Dan Ortiz has astutely termed “culturally compact.”35  
In Kennedy’s view, there was not only “a 300-mile gap between the 
two Latino communities in District 25,” but a “similarly large gap be-
tween the needs and interests of the two groups.”36  How, then, do we 
explain what it was about the “efficacious political identity” forged by 
Latinos in District 23 that differed from the identity of the Latinos in 
the offset district and the many other racial groups whose districts Jus-
tice Kennedy himself had helped to dismantle under Shaw? 
If we view Justice Kennedy’s story as a First Amendment tale, an 
underemphasized portion of LULAC comes into sharper focus.  Ken-
nedy did not stop with the Shaw language in condemning the offset 
district.  Instead, he said something quite different from what he had 
said in any of his Shaw opinions by explicitly linking Shaw to a worry 
about political efficacy: 
[T]here is no basis to believe a district that combines two far-flung seg-
ments of a racial group with disparate interests provides the opportunity 
that § 2 requires . . . .  
 . . . The practical consequence of drawing a district to cover two dis-
tant, disparate communities is that one or both groups will be unable to 
achieve their political goals.37  
In essence, Justice Kennedy concluded that the offset district was a  
forum non conveniens for Latinos seeking an “efficacious political  
identity.”38 
One interpretation of LULAC, then, is that the story Justice Ken-
nedy felt comfortable telling about race was not a story about race, but 
a First Amendment story, the dominant narrative of the electoral do-
main in Kennedy’s eyes.  Viewing LULAC through this First Amend-
ment lens enabled Kennedy to rethink his own vision of equal protec-
tion.  For the first time he was able to see an “efficacious political 
identity” that was also a racial one. 
In the next section, I will argue that in Parents Involved Kennedy 
took another step away from the colorblindness camp by acknowledg-
ing the state’s inevitable role in constructing the space in which citi-
zens work out questions of identity.  Given that his opinion in Parents 
Involved unexpectedly looked to race-conscious districting as a tool for 
desegregation, one might be tempted to trace that acknowledgement 
back to LULAC.  After all, until LULAC, whenever Justice Kennedy 
saw a majority-minority district, he saw bad social engineering, an ef-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 50 
(2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol105/ortiz.pdf.  
 36 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 37 Id. at 2618–19. 
 38 For other interpretations of this passage, see Charles, supra note 27 (manuscript at 12); and 
Karlan, supra note 27, at 760. 
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fort to pull together “far-flung” members of the same racial group.  In 
District 23, he saw an organic racial and political community coalesc-
ing precisely because it was concentrated in the same district.  Surely 
in the back of his mind Justice Kennedy realized that District 23 was 
the product of some past social engineering — and that its preserva-
tion would similarly require a conscious choice.  Indeed, on Kennedy’s 
own account, when the state privileged politics over race in disman-
tling District 23, it destroyed a political community it ought to have 
preserved.  And when the state privileged race over politics in drawing 
the offset district, it constructed an artificial political community des-
tined for failure.  Didn’t this juxtaposition make clear to Justice Ken-
nedy that, no matter what a state’s intention in drawing districts, it 
necessarily creates a forum in which racial identity is expressed? 
The more modest and defensible read of LULAC is that Justice 
Kennedy did not go that far.  In finding that the state could not dis-
mantle a district just as Latinos were about to elect their candidate of 
choice, Justice Kennedy seemed to be guided by an instinct that the 
state should “do no harm.”  That is, he was simply insisting that when 
Latinos assert an authentic political identity, even a racialized one, the 
state cannot prevent its full expression.  It is, of course, still notewor-
thy that Justice Kennedy thought there was something here to harm — 
that a racialized political identity had emerged that was worth pre-
serving.  Nonetheless, even if LULAC brought Justice Kennedy to the 
point of recognizing a claim to a racialized identity, there is some dis-
tance between forbidding state interference with its full expression and 
blessing state efforts to create it.  It was not until Parents Involved, the 
second part of Kennedy’s journey, that he seemed to shift his views on 
the idea of neutrality. 
B.  Parents Involved 
When we read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved 
against the background of LULAC, portions of his concurrence emerge 
in bas-relief.  Most obviously, it is easier to make sense of Justice Ken-
nedy’s willingness to place his faith in race-conscious districting and 
his suggestion at the end of the opinion that the assertion of racial 
identity is an expressive act.  We can also identify more subtle shifts in 
Justice Kennedy’s views: his new sensitivity to the messiness of the 
public/private distinction, his refusal to cast Parents Involved as yet 
another case in which race must be kept out of state decisionmaking, 
his insistence that his conservative colleagues are not thinking hard 
enough about the ways in which a colorblind approach will interact 
with social realities.  As I argue below, these parts of the opinion sug-
gest a dawning awareness of the complexities that inhere in these de-
bates, and all seem fairly traceable to a domain-centered narrative 
about public education.  To be sure, the dominant narrative of Justice 
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Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved remains a story about race, one 
that largely fits with his prior anti-essentialist jurisprudence.  But the 
novel elements — the bits and pieces that do not follow easily from his 
prior jurisprudence — make more sense if we think of them as a nar-
rative about the domain of public education, a story about teaching 
civic morality rather than guaranteeing equality. 
There is, of course, a significant difference between the First 
Amendment story that Kennedy associates with the electoral domain 
and the story he tells about the educational one.  For conservative 
judges like Justice Kennedy, one of the main purposes of public schools 
is to educate future citizens.39  Precisely because the state’s job is to 
inculcate civic values, judges who subscribe to this view are more than 
willing to relax constitutional rules so the school may fulfill its educa-
tional mission.40 
It is not hard to imagine why a domain-centered narrative about 
schools would nudge Justice Kennedy’s equal protection jurisprudence 
in a new direction.  To begin, Justice Kennedy might suspect that seg-
regated schools are not the ideal environment for teaching students 
about the value of race neutrality.  Indeed, the hope of Brown is that if 
students from different backgrounds “learn together, . . . [they] 
will . . . learn to live together.”41  Further, because schools are a con-
text in which conservative judges are accustomed to relaxing constitu-
tional rules so that schools can teach their students civic morality, we 
might expect Kennedy to be more flexible about race neutrality in this 
context.  If we look to the novel parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion — 
past the anti-essentialism boilerplate Justice Kennedy trots out when 
he tells his usual story about race — we see a number of signs that a 
domain-centered narrative is nudging Kennedy in just these directions. 
The way Justice Kennedy frames his opinion provides some evi-
dence that a domain-centered narrative is driving him.  Justice Ken-
nedy’s fellow travelers in the colorblindness camp largely cast this case 
as implicating society’s aspirations of equality.  Chief Justice Roberts, 
for instance, opens his analysis by invoking general equal protection 
principles42 and ends with the aphorism that “[t]he way to stop dis-
crimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that when the government acts as “educator” rather than “sovereign,” it “is engaged in inculcating 
social values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people”). 
 40 See generally James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335 
(2000) (analyzing ways in which constitutional principles are applied in schools).  To understand 
the depth of this commitment, one need look no further than another end-of-Term blockbuster, 
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), better known as the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case. 
 41 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 42 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751–52. 
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of race.”43  Justice Thomas begins his concurrence by characterizing 
the case as being about “state entities” rather than public schools,44 
and he ends by invoking general language on race from Dred Scott 
and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.45 
Justice Kennedy, in sharp contrast, anchors his concurrence in the 
domain of education.  He opens his opinion by trumpeting the role 
that public schools play in teaching civic morality and explicitly link-
ing that role to integration.  “The Nation’s schools strive to teach that 
our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures 
uniting in commitment to the freedom of all,” he writes, and the school 
defendants “seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that re-
flect the racial makeup of the surrounding community.”46  While Ken-
nedy disagrees with the means the schools have chosen to pursue that 
goal, he writes that their concern about integration “should remind us 
our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled” and represents “a compel-
ling educational goal.”47  This opening certainly resonates with parts of 
Brown’s legacy.  But its core narrative is less about equal educational 
opportunity, the dominant note in any equal protection story, than 
about the role schools play in teaching civic morality. 
A domain-centered narrative might also explain some of the more 
surprising passages in Kennedy’s concurrence — those portions criti-
cizing his colleagues for ignoring the relationship between law and cul-
ture and his unexpected legal-realist riff on the public/private distinc-
tion.  Twice Justice Kennedy pointedly rebukes his conservative 
colleagues for failing to come to grips with the ways in which the prin-
ciple of colorblindness interacts with social realities.48  In an even 
more striking passage, he concedes that it is impossible to draw a clear 
line between de jure and de facto discrimination and admits that the 
distinction is a useful legal fiction: 
  From the standpoint of the victim, it is true, an injury stemming from 
racial prejudice can hurt as much when the demeaning treatment based 
on race identity stems from bias masked deep within the social order as 
when it is imposed by law.  The distinction between government and pri-
vate action, furthermore, can be amorphous both as a historical matter 
and as a matter of present-day finding of fact.  Laws arise from a culture 
and vice versa.  Neither can assign to the other all responsibility for per-
sisting injustices. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Id. at 2768 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 44 Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 45 Id. at 2787–88. 
 46 Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 47 Id. at 2788–89. 
 48 See id. at 2791 (“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too 
often it does.”); id. at 2792 (“[A]s an aspiration, Justice Harlan’s axiom must command our assent.  
In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”). 
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  . . . It must be conceded [that the] primary function [of the distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation] was to delimit the powers of the 
Judiciary in the fashioning of remedies.49 
Has Justice Kennedy suddenly started channeling Robert Cover?50  
Though a gesture toward social realities is a conventional response 
from middle Justices to the colorblindness camp, there is a good dis-
tance between a worry about all-white student bodies and the idea 
that law-affects-culture-affects-law. 
These passages are difficult to reconcile with a purely anti-
essentialist approach.  After all, if the injury at issue is the state’s de-
liberate use of a racial classification, the distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation is perfectly sensible.  If Kennedy were telling 
his usual story about race, he should also agree with his colleagues that 
social realities ought not intrude on the Court’s calculus (with the ex-
ception of the cultural effects of legally enforced racial classifications). 
If we view Kennedy’s opinion through the lens of a domain-
centered narrative, however, his unexpected interest in social realities 
and the relationship between law and culture suddenly makes more 
sense.  After all, if Kennedy thinks that integration furthers a school’s 
educational mission, he is right to worry about social realities and de 
facto segregation.  And he should also worry about the way that law 
affects culture — specifically, the way that a rigid mandate of race 
neutrality would affect the educational culture of our public schools. 
A domain-centered narrative might also explain why Justice Ken-
nedy temporarily adopts the vernacular of a critical theorist.  Public 
schools are, of course, a place where the state regulates pervasively, 
and at least on Kennedy’s account, their job is to teach students to be 
citizens.  This combination — pervasive regulation and an identifiable 
mission — makes it particularly hard to insist upon a race-neutral ap-
proach.  When the state regulates pervasively, it is hard to claim that 
any choice the state makes is truly neutral.  After all, if you think the 
goal of public education is to create citizens, you have to know what 
kind of citizens you want to create.  And when the state’s regulatory 
mission is identifiable, we have a baseline for evaluating whether that 
mission is well served by a race-neutral approach.  Indeed, even a 
judge committed to the colorblind ideal might worry, as Kennedy 
seems to, that the value of colorblindness cannot be learned in a ra-
cially segregated school.  The narrative of the educational domain, 
then, may be what focuses Justice Kennedy on the poor fit between his 
preference for a race-neutral state and his desire for a race-neutral so-
ciety.  Perhaps this is why the question for Kennedy seems to have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Id. at 2795–96. 
 50 Or Robert Post and Reva Siegel.  Or the critical race theorists.  Or the many other academ-
ics who write in a critical vein. 
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changed in the domain of education.  It is no longer whether the state 
can act race consciously, but how. 
A domain-centered narrative might also help rationalize what seem 
like inconsistencies in Kennedy’s jurisprudence.  For example, Ken-
nedy simultaneously licenses states to engage in certain types of race-
conscious decisionmaking while flatly rejecting the dissent’s argument 
that we can use race to get beyond race.51  If Kennedy is focused on 
domains, however, it is plausible that he would maintain his strong 
commitment to colorblindness generally while worrying that in the 
educational domain a race-neutral approach might not promote a co-
lorblind ideal. 
The notion of domains might similarly make sense of Justice Ken-
nedy’s apparent reversal of his position in Grutter, where he dis-
sented.52  Whereas Justice Kennedy was unmoved by Justice 
O’Connor’s arguments in Grutter about the educational values associ-
ated with diversity in law school admissions, he makes a remarkably 
similar argument in Parents Involved, even observing that public 
schools could use a Grutter-like admissions policy as a last resort.53 
If one thinks in terms of domains, however, Kennedy’s position 
does not seem inconsistent.  Perhaps he objected to Justice O’Connor’s 
argument in Grutter because it — arguably unlike Powell’s in Bakke54 
— went well beyond a domain-centered narrative.  While she certainly 
emphasized educational diversity, her arguments extended beyond law 
schools, as Justice Scalia argued sharply in his dissent.55  Or perhaps 
Justice Kennedy sincerely believes what Scalia suggested only sarcasti-
cally in Grutter: that “‘“cross-racial understanding”’” and “good ‘citi-
zenship’” are lessons to be learned by “people three feet shorter and 20 
years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan 
Law School, in . . . public-school kindergartens.”56  Viewed from a 
domain-centered perspective, then, Justice Kennedy’s newfound em-
brace of Grutter suggests not a doctrinal switch, but a more fine-
grained approach to the educational domain than either O’Connor or 
Scalia offered in that case.57 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 52 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Comment: The Seattle and Louisville School 
Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REV. 158, 170 (2007) (noting Kennedy’s shift). 
 53 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 54 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–60 (2003). 
 55 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Post, supra note 54, at 60. 
 56 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 330–31 (majority opinion)). 
 57 Thus, Judge Wilkinson is right to describe Kennedy’s “skepticism of racial classifications”  
as “heartfelt,” Wilkinson, supra note 52, at 170, despite Kennedy’s embrace of Grutter in this  
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Finally, a domain-centered narrative might help us make sense of 
the strategies Justice Kennedy licenses schools to use to avoid resegre-
gation.  Kennedy is willing to let the state consider race at the whole-
sale level but not at the retail level.  Although he insists that the state 
may not engage in “a systematic, individual typing by race,”58 he is 
perfectly comfortable with what he repeatedly describes as “indirect” 
and “general” race-conscious strategies: siting schools, drawing atten-
dance zones, allocating resources, recruiting students and faculty, and 
tracking statistics.59 
The obvious question, of course, is why one would distinguish be-
tween retail and wholesale race consciousness.  The tension is particu-
larly acute with regard to Kennedy’s endorsement of race conscious-
ness in siting schools and drawing attendance zones, both variants of 
race-conscious districting.  Many academics — and I count myself 
among them — find such a distinction extraordinarily frustrating.  Af-
ter all, if one is worried about “allocat[ing] . . . governmental burdens 
and benefits” on the basis of race,60 both the school assignment policies 
challenged in Parents Involved and race-conscious districting do so.  
As Kennedy himself asked, “If it is legitimate for school authorities to 
work to avoid racial isolation in their schools, must they do so only by 
indirection and general policies?”61 
Justice Kennedy describes the difference between what I am calling 
his “wholesale” and “retail” strategies using the limited vernacular of 
intentional discrimination.  Having lived for a long time with the  
Powell/O’Connor compromise, most scholars will presumably do the 
same.  They may think that Justice Kennedy’s wholesale strategies are 
simply a “less” race-conscious means to achieve the same end or, as 
Kennedy himself hinted, a strategy for camouflaging the state’s use of 
race.62 
I nonetheless think that the notion of domains better captures the 
distinction Kennedy is trying to draw.  What unites Kennedy’s “whole-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
context.  Thanks to Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Reva Siegel for pushing me on this line of  
analysis.   
 58 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 59 Id. at 2792, 2796. 
 60 Id. at 2796. 
 61 Id. 
 62 For arguments that Powell’s and O’Connor’s approaches are designed to render the state’s 
use of race less transparent, see Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Su-
preme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928–29 
(1983); Post, supra note 54, at 74.  For arguments that Kennedy is doing the same, see James E. 
Ryan, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Comment: The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 138 (2007); and Posting of Lior Strahilevitz to The University of Chicago 
Law School Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/06/justice-kennedy. 
html (June 28, 2007, 12:11 PM).  
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sale” proposals is that they license the state to create an appropriate 
forum for students to learn about race.  They license schools to do, in 
other words, what Justice Kennedy has always thought they were sup-
posed to do when race is not involved: create a learning environment 
that will teach students to be good citizens. 
On this view, then, Kennedy is licensing the state to use race in a 
holistic, domain-constructing fashion — to create the right kind of 
space for students to learn about race.  Until Parents Involved, Ken-
nedy had taken a libertarian view on the construction of identity, in-
sisting that the best thing the state could do was stay out of debates 
about race.  “The moral imperative of racial neutrality,” he wrote in 
Croson, “is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause.”63  In 
Parents Involved, the unique nature of the domain seems to soften his 
libertarian instinct by suggesting a link between integration and the 
mission of schools.  He is thus willing to allow the state to be race-
conscious when it is thinking in terms of domain construction. 
When the state moves from wholesale to retail, from the domain to 
the individual, Kennedy’s libertarian instincts reemerge.  Perhaps that 
is because Kennedy thinks that the state is no longer constructing a 
space in which students choose their own identities.  Instead, it is 
choosing an identity for them.  “When the government classifies an in-
dividual by race,” he wrote in Parents Involved, “it must first define 
what it means to be of a race.”64 
If we cast Kennedy’s distinction between wholesale and retail race 
consciousness as a distinction between constructing domains and con-
structing identity, we can also make more sense of Justice Kennedy’s 
unexpectedly intense worry about the fact that Jefferson County could 
not definitively say whether its policies applied to kindergarteners.65  
Kennedy says he is concerned about imprecision.66  But it is not clear 
why precision matters in the slightest if Kennedy is concerned with the 
injury associated with racial classifications (the colorblindness view) or 
with camouflaging the state’s reliance on them (the Powell/O’Connor 
view).  If Kennedy is thinking in domain-centered terms, however, his 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 64 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  For 
another explanation of the distinction Kennedy is drawing, see Andrew Carlon, Racial Adjudica-
tion, 2007 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8–12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997875.  For efforts to explore the doctrinal connections between 
desegregation plans and race-conscious districting, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the 
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1684–88 (2001); and Goodwin Liu, Seattle 
and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 301–09 (2007). 
 65 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 66 Id. 
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irritation is easier to understand.  Why should the Court accord 
schools extra constitutional leeway to construct an educational space if 
they don’t seem to know what they are doing? 
Similarly, the distinction between wholesale/domain construction 
and retail/identity construction helps explain Kennedy’s distaste for 
Seattle’s “crude” categorization scheme, which classified students as 
either “white” or “non-white.”67  Again, if Kennedy were focused on 
classification or camouflage, fine-grained categories are little different 
from crude ones.  But if one is worried about the state’s interfering 
with individual self-expression, crude categories matter a good deal.  
Perhaps this is why Kennedy closes his opinion with an echo of 
LULAC, suggesting that the assertion of racial identity is an expressive 
act: “Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his 
own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention 
that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”68 
*     *     *     * 
Parents Involved thus both echoes LULAC and moves a step be-
yond it.  In both cases, Kennedy viewed the assertion of racial identity 
as an expressive act, one with which the state ought not interfere.  In 
both cases, the anti-essentialist language of his prior opinions morphs 
into a more positive vision of racial identity.  But Parents Involved 
moves beyond LULAC.  It not only acknowledges race’s associational 
and expressive dimensions, but shows some awareness of the relation-
ship between the two — the possibility that the choices the state 
makes in grouping individuals will affect the choices individuals make 
in expressing their identity.  That awareness leads Justice Kennedy to 
do something quite new in Parents Involved: brainstorm about the 
most useful race-conscious strategies the state can use to construct the 
forum in which children learn about race. 
These positions represent new developments in Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence.  In his prior decisions, he viewed racial categories with 
nothing but suspicion.  By recasting at least parts of these two stories 
about race in domain-centered terms, he begins to see positive dimen-
sions to the expression of racial identity, whether it is the “efficacious 
political identity” found by Latinos in LULAC or the act of self-
definition Kennedy described in Parents Involved.  Justice Kennedy’s 
overriding impulse in both contexts remains the same — do no harm; 
never force a racial identity upon anyone — and is thus roughly con-
sonant with his prior jurisprudence.  But in LULAC the idea of “do no 
harm” expands to encompass the notion that a state cannot dismantle 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Id. at 2790–91. 
 68 Id. at 2797.  I am indebted to Will Baude for suggesting this line of analysis. 
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a forum that would allow for the full expression of a racialized politi-
cal identity.  And in Parents Involved, the idea of “do no harm” ex-
tends to worries about the effects of a colorblind approach on schools’ 
educational mission.  The dominant note in both opinions remains a 
commitment to race neutrality, but their minor theme is a dawning 
recognition that this commitment translates differently in different 
domains. 
One can also see that the contours of Justice Kennedy’s “settle-
ment” on race are different from those of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” set-
tlement long associated with the Court’s fifth vote.  At the level of 
general atmospherics, the settlement offered by Powell and O’Connor 
was the compromise of a pragmatist.  It treated race as an inconven-
ient fact — one to be dealt with, to be sure, but with few redeeming 
features.  At the level of specific doctrine, it offered a rather pedestrian 
sort of compromise between the existing camps, allowing race to be 
used but not in an obvious way.  And at least for Justice O’Connor, it 
was a settlement that readily translated to other domains. 
Even as Justice Kennedy stakes a middle ground in the colorblind-
ness debate, however, he remains an idealist.  His settlement does not 
merely tolerate the idea of racial identity, but acknowledges associa-
tional and expressive dimensions to race that are not obviously present 
in Powell’s or O’Connor’s compromises.  Indeed, as I discuss in the 
next Part, the most striking aspect of both opinions is that Justice 
Kennedy is starting to think about the relationship between the asso-
ciational and expressive dimensions of racial identity — between how 
people are grouped and how they understand themselves. 
Nonetheless, although Kennedy endorses a more complex, even a 
sunnier vision of race than his swing-vote predecessors did, his vision 
is also narrower.  It is tied to particular narratives about particular 
domains, making it difficult to guess whether Justice Kennedy’s will-
ingness to depart from his anti-essentialist script will extend beyond 
these facts and these contexts.  Put more sharply, the stories of LULAC 
and Parents Involved may be nothing more than that — stories, told 
once and not to be repeated. 
If we read Justice Kennedy’s opinions in LULAC and Parents In-
volved, we can identify the basic ingredients of a new approach — an 
openness to positive expressions of racial identity, a willingness to 
think harder about the state’s role in constructing it.  But even these 
simple propositions lead to a myriad of questions well beyond the 
scope of this Comment.  Has Kennedy correctly identified the domi-
nant narratives of these two domains?  Does connecting race and asso-
ciation lead us down the road traveled by Hannah Arendt or Herbert 
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Wechsler?69  What do we make of the deep tensions embedded in 
Kennedy’s approach, particularly in his distinction between retail and 
wholesale race consciousness?  Can Kennedy’s “do no harm” approach 
— the idea that racial identity should be chosen by individuals and not 
affixed by the state — hold up when one starts to think about con-
structing domains?  Because neither a judicial opinion nor an aca-
demic commentary could possibly address all of these questions, I will 
simply quote the Foreword’s author, Martha Nussbaum: “[T]ension 
within a theory does not necessarily show that it is defective; it may 
simply show that it is in touch with the difficulty of life.”70 
II.  OF DISPLACEMENT AND DOMAINS 
Given the constraints of this format, let me close by offering a few 
abbreviated reflections on two questions that follow directly from the 
analysis in Part I.  First, is displacement really a source of power?  
Section II.A considers whether the sort of domain-centered narratives 
that have led Kennedy to shift his views might be useful strategies for 
talking about race more generally.  Second, will a domain-centered ap-
proach produce an equal protection jurisprudence that is so radically 
contextualized that nothing can be generalized?  Section II.B answers 
this question in the negative, offering one example to show why it may 
be useful both to acknowledge that the puzzle of race is made up of 
distinct pieces and to try to figure out how those pieces fit together. 
A.  Displacement as a Source of Power 
One of the most interesting things about the new story that Justice 
Kennedy tells about race is that it is not really a story about race.  The 
novel portions of both LULAC and Parents Involved — the departures 
from Justice Kennedy’s usual anti-essentialist arguments — make 
more sense if we think of them as narratives about domains, not race.  
In LULAC’s stirring tale of political agency and expression, we could 
substitute virtually any other identity category — environmentalist, 
independent, gay — in place of the word “Latino” and the story would 
still make sense.  Similarly, consider Parents Involved’s story about 
school as a forum in which we learn about identity and choose our 
own.  We could insert other adjectives — religious, political, sexual — 
for the term “racial” and the story would still cohere. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 69 See Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 DISSENT 45 (1959); Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).  For two seminal 
responses to Wechsler, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); and Charles A. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of 
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
 70 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future of Feminist Liberalism, PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. 
PHIL. ASS’N, Nov. 2000, at 47, 68.   
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What do we make of the fact that by not talking directly about 
race, Justice Kennedy has found something new to say?  Returning to 
Stephen Greenblatt’s evocative notion that displacement can be a 
source of power — that writing about Macbeth helped him think more 
clearly about Iraq — is it possible that displacement can sometimes be 
an opportunity for constitutional growth rather than psychological 
avoidance?  It certainly seems true of Kennedy.  By shielding his eyes 
from the “neon light” of race and focusing on the story of the relevant 
domain, Justice Kennedy is able to see something new.  Kennedy has 
always thought of the political sphere as one involving robust associa-
tional and expressive dimensions, but he now sees how those values 
connect to racial politics.  Kennedy has always thought that the 
school’s role was to teach students the lessons of citizenship, but now 
he sees that those lessons extend to interracial relations. 
Indeed, the stories Justice Kennedy tells in these cases bring him 
closer to the views of many race scholars.  To offer a few dreadfully 
abbreviated examples, Kennedy’s story of the Latinos in District 23 
bears a passing resemblance to the work of Lani Guinier and Gerald 
Torres, who emphasize race’s associational dimensions and argue that 
race is “a political, not just a social, construction,” forged through “col-
lective interaction at the individual, group, and institutional level.”71  
In Parents Involved, Kennedy argues that individuals choose their own 
racial identity while acknowledging the state’s role in creating the fo-
rum in which they do so.  Many academics similarly claim that race is 
a semi-fluid category, shaped by acts of self-expression and external 
constraints.72 
Or consider the potentially rich set of ideas embedded in Justice 
Kennedy’s intuition that race has both associational and expressive 
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 71 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 14–15 (2002).  Other scholars have ex-
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Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1 (1998); cf. 
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dimensions and in his dawning awareness of the link between them.  
Though his opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved are not explicitly 
cast in these terms, both describe how association affects identity — 
how the choices the state makes in grouping individuals influence the 
choices individuals make in choosing their identity.  In LULAC, the 
question was whether the state created a district like District 23, where 
Latinos can develop an “efficacious political identity,” or a district like 
the offset district, which Kennedy thought would result in a “troubling 
blend of politics and race.”73  In Parents Involved, Kennedy concludes 
that the ways students are grouped will affect how they think about 
racial identity.  To be sure, the types of associations involved in the 
two cases — civic and political — further quite different ends.  But 
the underlying connection — that who is part of our community af-
fects who we become — is the same.74  Here, too, we see a richer story 
about equal protection than Justice Kennedy has told before. 
A critic might be tempted to pounce here.  If displacement is a 
source of power, shouldn’t academics be less dismissive of the Pow-
ell/O’Connor settlement on race?  After all, their overriding worry is 
that transparent uses of race will reify racial identity.    
It is hard to believe that avoiding the subject of race makes race go 
away.75  Indeed, not talking about race in this fashion seems degrading 
at some level, as if we equate race talk with talking about sex or one’s 
alcoholic uncle.  
There may, however, be a more nuanced way to think about dis-
placement.  What if, like Kennedy, we began with the story of the do-
main rather than with the story of race?  Most of us think we already 
know the story of race.  We tell the same story no matter what the 
domain.  Perhaps, like Kennedy, we might see something different if 
we told the story differently.  Every domain has an overarching narra-
tive.  What if we tried to fit the story of race within the narrative of 
the domain rather than vice versa? 
Consider a concrete example from my field, election law (presuma-
bly one could be drawn from almost any field).  As Pam Karlan has 
observed, one of the dominant stories about race told in the legal pro-
fession views racial minorities as “objects of judicial solicitude, rather 
than as efficacious political actors in their own right.”76  This is pre-
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 73 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2623 (2006). 
 74 If one is thinking about how a community’s composition affects conceptions of identity, one 
might think it quite striking that the three people invited to comment on Parents Involved are 
white. 
 75 Cf. Bernadette Park & Charles M. Judd, Rethinking the Link Between Categorization and 
Prejudice Within the Social Cognition Perspective, 9 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 108, 119–20 
(2005) (questioning whether a reduced emphasis on categories will reduce bias).   
 76 Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 
114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1332 (2005). 
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cisely the story most judges, practitioners, and scholars tell in the elec-
toral domain.  For instance, they fold majority-minority districts into 
whatever variant of the conventional story they prefer.  Liberals tend 
to view majority-minority districts as a race-conscious strategy for in-
tegrating the legislature.  Conservatives generally see them as yet an-
other example of what they think of as hand-outs, akin to affirmative 
action or minority business set-asides. 
Election law scholars, in sharp contrast, tend to see racial minori-
ties as they see other groups in the political system — as “efficacious 
political actors” rather than as “objects of judicial solicitude” — and to 
tell a distinctive story about race and districting.  For instance, Sam 
Issacharoff and Pam Karlan have recently argued that majority-
minority districts did more to improve the lives of racial minorities 
than decades of judicial solicitude because they put blacks and Latinos 
in a position to advance their own cause: 
Whether it be state commitments to affirmative action in education, or 
minority preferences in contracting, or minority opportunity in state em-
ployment, or securing minority representation through redistricting, the 
steady advancement in the creation of a black middle class has depended 
on the vigilance of a black political class. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he Voting Rights Act has given minority citizens the abil-
ity . . . [to reach] a far higher ground and a far more level playing field 
than the Supreme Court would have provided.77 
Election law scholars tell this story precisely because they are so 
enmeshed in their field.  Whereas most scholars cannot help but think 
of the electoral domain as yet another story about race, election law 
scholars cannot help but see race as yet another story about the elec-
toral domain.  And by focusing on the domain rather than on race per 
se, they end up telling a distinctive tale about equal protection. 
Here, then, is a vision of displacement as a source of power in the 
context of race.  The Powell/O’Connor story is about not talking about 
race (or at least not appearing to talk about it).  My vision of dis-
placement involves talking about race but anchoring it within the ap-
propriate constitutional domain.  The hope is that if we start the story 
at a different place, we might end it differently. 
B.  Putting the Puzzle Back Together Again 
It is difficult, of course, to resist calls for more attention to context.  
Who wants to take a stand against precision?  But one might reasona-
bly worry that a domain-centered approach will result in a set of sto-
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 77 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection Clause, 
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 35, 49–50 (2003). 
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ries about race so disjointed that we will miss the overarching themes 
that unite them.  Little good can come from a discourse on race so 
radically contextualized that nothing is generalizable.  Thus, while it is 
helpful to use domain-centered narratives to break down our mono-
lithic vision of race, there is a difference between envisioning equal 
protection jurisprudence as pieces in a puzzle and insisting those pieces 
bear no connection to one another. 
This is all a bit abstract, so let me ground it with a concrete exam-
ple showing why it may be helpful to use domain-centered narratives 
to break down a monolithic tale about race while still thinking about 
how those domain-centered stories fit together.  Justice Kennedy draws 
a distinction between electoral districts and school districts.  If we 
think through Kennedy’s proposal in terms of domains but with an eye 
for the broader narrative, we end up with an account that is critical of 
both camps in the colorblindness debate.78 
Just as Kennedy tailors his equal protection story to the dominant 
narrative of each domain, so too he urges a tailored solution.  Specifi-
cally, Justice Kennedy seems to contemplate the use of different dis-
tricting strategies when drawing electoral districts and school districts.  
In LULAC, Kennedy held that a state must maintain a majority-
minority district to facilitate the representation of a group of Latinos 
who had found a politically efficacious identity.  In Parents Involved, 
in contrast, while Justice Kennedy did not delve into the specifics, he 
seems to have proposed drawing school districts and attendance zones 
that roughly mirror the population of the community as a whole. 
The fact that Justice Kennedy proposed two different districting so-
lutions in these two cases certainly lends credence to the claim that a 
domain-centered narrative was driving the opinions.  After all, if we 
look to the colorblindness debate, both sides have long adhered to a 
one-size-fits-all approach.  Members of each camp tend to be either for 
majority-minority districts or against them, but relatively little thought 
has been devoted to adapting one’s districting strategies to the kind of 
district being drawn.79 
It is easy to see how a domain-centered narrative would coincide 
with Kennedy’s intuitions about how districts should be drawn.  To 
offer a few crude distinctions, the common view is that schools are 
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 78 Although this Comment draws inspiration from Robert Post’s work, in some senses this is a 
non-Postian undertaking.  Though Post emphasizes the messiness and interconnectedness of the 
domains he identifies, see, e.g., POST, supra note 12, at 3, he is skeptical of efforts to develop a 
unified theory of the First Amendment across domains, id. at 16. 
 79 Exceptions include Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 
1121–42 (2005) (distinguishing between levels of governance and types of governing institutions); 
and Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial 
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 221–36 (1989) (exploring alternative 
voting systems for local elections).  
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supposed to make people capable of making political choices; districts 
are supposed to ensure people are able to do so.  The goal of public 
schools is to train citizens, and the goal of districting is to represent 
them.  In districting, we care about who sits in the legislature.  In 
schools, we care about who sits in the classroom.  On this conventional 
view, majority-minority electoral districts ensure that the legislature 
looks like the community from which it is drawn.  And statistically in-
tegrated school districts and attendance zones ensure that the class-
room looks like the community from which it is drawn.80 
Here, then, is a reason to think in domain-centered terms.  At the 
very least, we would avoid the mistake made by the majority in Shaw 
v. Reno, which termed majority-minority districts “an effort to segre-
gate the races.”81  Whatever one thinks of the state’s use of race to cre-
ate majority-minority districts, a domain-centered narrative makes 
clear that their purpose is integrative.  If one subscribes to a mono-
lithic view of race, however, it is tempting to term majority-minority 
districts “segregated.”  Indeed, given the talismanic significance of 
Brown, it is all too easy to classify every institution as either “segre-
gated” or “integrated.”82  A domain-centered narrative suggests that 
the dissenters in the Shaw cases were right to insist that equal protec-
tion doctrine is not monolithic and to chastise the Shaw majority for 
terming majority-minority districts segregated.83 
But the Shaw dissenters were wrong, in my view, not to think 
harder about how the pieces of the equal protection puzzle fit together 
when they got to Parents Involved.  By focusing too heavily on the dif-
ferences between domains and ignoring the potential connections be-
tween them, the dissenters in Parents Involved may have made the 
same analytic error as the majority in Shaw.  Just as the Shaw major-
ity termed districts “segregated” simply because they were not statisti-
cally integrated, so too the Parents Involved dissenters labeled schools 
“segregated” simply because a majority of the students were racial mi-
norities.84  In both instances, bodies with a sizeable number of whites 
got lumped into the same category as the racial enclaves of Jim Crow. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 There are also important practical differences between these domains.  For instance, the 
problem of white flight exists for school districts but not electoral ones because people do not vote 
with their feet in electoral districts.  Further, as James Ryan explains, districting strategies are 
unlikely to engender a fundamental change in the way our school system works given the size of 
residentially segregated neighborhoods.  Ryan, supra note 62, at 144–46. 
 81 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). 
 82 For a full discussion of these issues, see Gerken, supra note 79, at 1106–09.  I agree with 
James Ryan, however, that “meaningful integration requires a nontrivial number of students from 
different racial or ethnic backgrounds.”  Ryan, supra note 62, at 145.  My quarrel here is with the 
idea that a school is “segregated” simply because racial minorities are in the majority. 
 83 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 928 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Bush v. 
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1055 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 84 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2802–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The question is whether the Justices who termed majority-minority 
districts integrated in Shaw were too quick to term majority-minority 
schools segregated in Parents Involved.85  The impulse behind this dis-
tinction is easy to grasp: a domain-centered narrative, which suggests 
that our goals should be integrated legislatures and integrated schools.  
But if we want an integrated society — one in which racial minorities 
are as much a part of the warp and woof of the polity as any other 
group is — that answer falls short.  We care about statistically inte-
grated schools and statistically integrated legislatures at least in part 
because we seek dynamically integrative institutions, institutions that 
will move us toward a genuinely integrated society. 
To be sure, if we want to design dynamically integrative institu-
tions, we must be attentive to the domain in which each institution 
sits.  Dynamic integration will surely mean different things in different 
domains.  But that attentiveness to context should not prevent us from 
seeing potential connections between those domain-centered stories.  
Here, for example, there may be more lessons to be drawn from the 
electoral domain than the dissenters in Parents Involved seemed to 
recognize.  Sometimes a domain-centered narrative can be too tidy. 
The domain-centered narratives described above may be too tidy.  
A central justification for treating electoral districts differently from 
schools is that districts are supposed to represent citizens whereas 
schools are supposed to create them.  The problem with this neat cate-
gorization is that it overlooks the possibility that districts can also be 
sites for constructing identity.  As Michael Kang argues, it is a mistake 
to think that districting is simply about representing preexisting 
groups; it is also “about what group alignments emerge and become 
politically relevant in the first place.”86  If districts resemble schools in 
at least this modest way, then we should be careful that a domain-
centered narrative does not prevent us from seeing ways in which the 
race narratives in each domain might ultimately connect. 
In what I think of as the most important piece on race and redis-
tricting in the last few years, Michael Kang offers an example of a race 
narrative in the electoral arena that might translate into other do-
mains.  He theorizes that majority-minority districts are useful because 
they temporarily pull race out of the political discussion and thereby 
help fracture rather than reify racial categories.  Kang points out that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 Justice Thomas certainly thought so, though for different reasons than those suggested here.  
See, e.g., id. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Racial imbalance is not segregation.”).  Needless to 
say, I do not subscribe to his view that the dissenters’ arguments should be equated with those of 
Brown-era segregationists, see id. at 2782–88. 
 86 Michael S. Kang, The Politics of Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 2008) (manuscript at 27, on file with the Harvard Law School Library); cf. Gerken, supra 
note 79, at 1142–52. 
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where voting is racially polarized, racial minorities have every incen-
tive to vote monolithically along racial lines because that is their only 
hope of electing their candidate of choice.  The result, writes Kang, is 
that race becomes a “conversation stopper”: “politics freeze along the 
axis of race, crowding out room for deliberation and presentation of 
choices for the public along other dimensions of policy and identity.”87 
Kang argues that the solution to this problem is majority-minority 
districts.  In such districts, Kang points out, it is all but a given that 
the minority group’s candidate of choice will win the general election.  
That means that minority voters can enjoy the luxury of division and 
debate during the primary.88  Rather than coalescing behind a single 
candidate, racial minorities can choose among different platforms and 
debate the “more optimistic question of who [their] candidate of choice 
will be.”89  Racial minorities, in other words, are able to engage in the 
usual stuff of pluralist politics.  They can thus identify themselves as 
“temporary, contingent members of self-formed groups,”90 something 
that would be impossible — or at least unwise — during a general 
election.  On Kang’s view, majority-minority districts temporarily dis-
place race, allowing racial minorities to politick the way any other 
group politicks. 
Note how Kang’s claim connects to the questions raised by LULAC 
and Parents Involved about the relationship between association and 
expression.  Kang’s argument is that the state’s choices about how to 
group voters affect how voters experience and express racial identity.  
Suggesting yet another variant of displacement as a source of power, 
Kang argues that one form of association — majority-minority districts 
— usefully places race in the background for some part of the electoral 
cycle.  He also suggests that other strategies for grouping voters — ma-
jority-white districts — may foreground racial concerns in a destruc-
tive fashion.  If Kang is correct, districts that are not statistically inte-
grated may nonetheless be dynamically integrative for reasons that 
have little to do with whether they produce a legislature that looks like 
the polity. 
An unduly tidy vision of domains would prevent us from asking 
whether the dynamic that Michael Kang identifies in majority-
minority districts applies to schools as well.  Given the limited and 
sometimes conflicting evidence that exists on this question,91 all I want 
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 87 Kang, supra note 86 (manuscript at 30). 
 88 Id. (manuscript at 32). 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. (quoting MINOW, supra note 72, at 96) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 91 Both sides of the debate in Parents Involved agreed that the extant empirical evidence was 
mixed.  Compare Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring), with id. at 2820–
21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Moreover, these studies have tended to focus on concrete measures, like 
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to do here is suggest the question’s relevance, taking no position on its 
answer.  Perhaps it would be a welcome relief for black and Latino 
students to inhabit a world in which they were not constantly re-
minded of their minority status.  We are, after all, often most conscious 
of a particular aspect of our identity when we find ourselves to be an 
outlier.  Or perhaps Justice Kennedy is right.  It may be that because 
of the overlay of socioeconomic conditions or the persistence of racial 
subordination or the ways in which school kids interact or the preva-
lence of racially homogenous neighborhoods or the existence of many 
differences between the electoral and educational domains, statistically 
integrated schools are the path to genuine integration.92 
The point here is simply that, as with districting, critical distinc-
tions can get lost when we describe institutions as either “segregated” 
or “integrated.”  And that is a lesson that comes both from thinking of 
domain-centered narratives as parts of a puzzle and from trying to fig-
ure out how the pieces fit together.  Without access to a domain-
centered narrative, we cannot move away from a monolithic tale of 
race and explain why majority-minority districts should not be con-
demned as segregated.  And without an effort to think about how the 
pieces in the equal protection puzzle connect, we cannot see that both 
districts and schools constitute sites for working out racial identity, and 
will thus close ourselves off to potentially useful lines of inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved invite 
us to abandon our monolithic stories about race and think about equal 
protection in domain-centered terms.  I, for one, welcome the invita-
tion, and that is not merely because I am grateful to Justice Kennedy 
for declining to join the plurality’s deeply mistaken interpretation of 
Brown.  The debate between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer 
is one we have been having for a very long time.  Perhaps it is time to 
shift the terrain.  If Justice Kennedy can find something new to say, 
maybe so can we. 
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